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My Round Two essay, which argued that Japan's stockpile of plutonium undercuts the disarmament 
message of the Hibakusha, seems to have been the inspiration for my colleague Akira Kawasaki to 
discuss "the double standards inherent in Japan's nuclear policies." Here in Round Three, I'll reciprocate 
by discussing the nuclear double standards of my own nation, Turkey. 
Turkey is a member in good standing of the nonproliferation and disarmament regimes—a signatory to 
instruments such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban 
Treaty and a member of initiatives such as the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group. 
Moreover, it has long advocated creating a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Turkish 
officials, in view of the Middle East's increasingly dire security situation, portray establishing a nuclear-
weapon-free zone as a matter of urgent collective responsibility. 
But Turkey is also a member of NATO, and in the context of the alliance's security strategy and its 
principles of solidarity and burden sharing, Ankara has for decades allowed US nuclear weapons to be 
deployed in Turkish territory. Officials believe these weapons strengthen Washington's commitment to 
transatlantic security and contribute to the credibility of extended deterrence. 
So on one hand, Turkey is committed to a world free of nuclear weapons. On the other hand, Ankara 
allows US nuclear weapons within its territory and emphasizes that disarmament will require time and 
patience—indeed, that total disarmament will not be possible any time soon. This contradictory 
approach diminishes Turkey's stature in the nonproliferation and disarmament regimes—at least in the 
eyes of Turkey's Middle Eastern neighbors, whose cooperation is indispensable if a nuclear-weapon-
free zone in the region is to be established. To eliminate the contradiction and establish consistency with 
Turkey's long-stated principles, Ankara should—through a deliberate review process and close 
consultations with Washington—begin the process of returning tactical nuclear weapons to the United 
States. 
Turkish officials might argue that sending US weapons back where they belong would undermine 
Turkey's security. But even as NATO-Russia relations worsen amid developments in Ukraine, 
imagining a "hot" confrontation between NATO and Russia—let alone a nuclear exchange—is, in the 
language of the strategist Herman Kahn, "thinking about the unthinkable." Even if such a scenario played 
out, tactical nuclear weapons would barely play a role! 
Moreover, NATO could provide extended deterrence to Turkey through means other than basing nuclear 
weapons on Turkish soil. For example, US nuclear-armed submarines could temporarily be deployed in 
the eastern Mediterranean. They could pay port visits to Turkey. Steps such as these would deliver a 
powerful message to unfriendly countries. For that matter, no nuclear weapons are deployed in 20 of 28 
NATO nations, but all 28 are covered under the alliance's nuclear umbrella. 
Paradoxically, should nuclear weapons be withdrawn from Turkey, some Western experts might look 
suspiciously at Turkey’s plans for nuclear power, wondering if Ankara intended to develop nuclear 
weapons of its own. But Turkey would have no security-based incentive to follow such a course. And 
embarking on a nuclear weapons adventure would complicate Turkey's already strained relations with 
the European Union, damaging Turkish ambitions for eventual EU membership. 
Other European nations that host US nuclear weapons have engaged in their own debates about whether 
to retain them. Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Belgium—all have expressed willingness at least 
to discuss removing US nuclear weapons from the European continent. Some other countries, concerned 
about their security position vis-à-vis Russia, have resisted the idea (as has Turkey itself). But against 
such a backdrop, Turkey would not be out of place if it engaged in serious discussions about removing 
the weapons from its territory. 
The Turkish public, meanwhile, isn't favorably disposed toward NATO and the United States these days. 
As NATO has transformed itself from a collective defense organization with a "hard power" stance into 
a collective security organization with a "soft power" stance, its powerful image has been diluted. NATO 
is increasingly seen as primarily serving US interests and maintaining US hegemony. Anti-American 
sentiment is pervasive in Turkey today, and removing US nuclear weapons from Turkish soil would 
likely be a popular step. 
Hosting US nuclear weapons does little to enhance Turkish security. But it undermines Turkey's 
nonproliferation and disarmament credentials and rankles the Turkish public. The time has come for 
Washington to take its weapons home. 
